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INTRODUCTION
For eleven years, cybersecurity experts from around the globe have gathered
in Tallinn, Estonia for the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence’s annual Cyber Conference (or “CyCon”).1 Estonia is the perfect
venue for such a conference, both because its government has invested heavily
in digital infrastructure,2 and because a massive 2007 cyberattack effectively
shuttered Estonia’s economy.3 In short, Estonia is heavily invested not only in
moving its people, businesses, and government into the digital age, but also in
ensuring the security of cyberspace.
During the CyCon keynote opening speech on May 31, 2019, Estonia’s
president, Kersti Kaljulaid, stressed the importance of international law and
NATO’s “collective defense posture,” and explained why such unity is
necessary in cyberspace.4 President Kaljulaid’s many comments received
widespread attention, none more so than the following: “Estonia is furthering
the position that states which are not directly injured may apply countermeasures
to support the state directly affected by the malicious cyber operation. The
countermeasures applied should follow the principle of proportionality and other
principles established within the international customary law.”5
Countermeasures are “State actions, or omissions, directed at another State
that would otherwise violate an obligation owed to that State and that are
conducted by the former in order to compel or convince the latter to desist its

* Assistant Professor, United States Naval Academy, Department of Cyber Science. Thanks to Evan
Field, Ido Kilovaty, and Kurt Sanger for valuable feedback. The views expressed in this Article are only
the author’s and do not reflect those of the Naval Academy, Department of the Navy, or Department of
Defense.
1
See CYCON, https://cycon.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
2
See Nathan Heller, Estonia, The Digital Republic, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/estonia-the-digital-republic (“The normal services
that government is involved with—legislation, voting, education, justice, health care, banking, taxes,
policing, and so on—have been digitally linked across one platform, wiring up the nation.”).
3
See Damien McGuinness, How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia, BBC (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415 (“The result for Estonian citizens was that cash machines and
online banking services were sporadically out of action; government employees were unable to
communicate with each other on email; and newspapers and broadcasters suddenly found they couldn't
deliver the news.”).
4
President Kaljulaid at CyCon 2019: Cyber Attacks Should Not be an Easy Weapon, ERR NEWS
(May 29, 2019), https://news.err.ee/946827/president-kaljulaid-at-cycon-2019-cyber-attacks-shouldnot-be-easy-weapon [hereinafter Kaljulaid Comments].
5
Id.
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own internationally wrongful acts or omissions.”6 As will be described in Part I
of this Essay, countermeasures are typically carried out by the State that has
experienced a violation of international legal obligations, and it is unsettled
whether an uninjured State could carry out countermeasures on behalf of another
State. In her CyCon speech, President Kaljulaid made clear that such
“collective” countermeasures in cyberspace are not only permissible, but
desirable. “The threats to the security of states increasingly involve unlawful
cyber operations,” she said. “It is therefore important that states may respond
collectively to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic action is insufficient,
but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. Allies matter also in cyberspace.”7
Kaljilaid then stated that “in many ways there is nothing really that special
or groundbreaking.”8 That might be short selling the importance of her clear
statement. To have the president of a nation—particularly a NATO member that
is at the forefront of cybersecurity policy—clearly urge the use of collective
countermeasures is remarkable. Shortly after President Kaljilaid’s comments,
Naval War College Professor Michael Schmitt, a leading scholar in the
application of international law to cyber operations, noted that the use of
collective countermeasures “remains unresolved in international law, and
therefore ripe for interpretation by States. Estonia was the first State to publicly
speak to the issue, and it did so unequivocally.”9
In this Essay, I argue that President Kaljilaid’s call for collective
countermeasures is the correct normative approach. Just as the threats that
nations face in cyberspace often cross borders, so, too, should the ability to
prevent and mitigate harm. The limited guidance from international legal
authorities has not directly condoned collective countermeasures. Under the
traditional countermeasures model, State A can exercise countermeasures
against State B only if State B has violated an international legal obligation to
State A. While there is good reason for this legal position, it was developed
before the era of cyber aggression, and fails to address the disperse and
asymmetric nature of modern threats. To be sure, collective countermeasures
should be used carefully and should be subject to the same restrictions as
individual countermeasures.
Part I of this Essay defines countermeasures and outlines their limitations,
including an overview of the historical debate over collective countermeasures.
Part II examines the use and potential use of countermeasures to combat
evolving threats that nations face in cyberspace and argues that these new
developments suggest a reconsideration of the general sentiment against
collective countermeasures. Part II then addresses the valid concerns regarding
collective countermeasures by suggesting potential limits to their use.

6
Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response
Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 700 (2014).
7
Kaljulaid Comments, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
Michael Schmitt, Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (June 10,
2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/.
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I. THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES
Much discussion of the international law of war in cyberspace focuses on
the ability of a state to justify forceful responses against another state in selfdefense,10 an exception to the U.N. Charter’s general rule that states may not use
force. However, for a state to qualify for that exception, it must have been the
target of an “armed attack” (or, under the United States’ view, at least a use of
force).11 Whether an incident rises to the level of “use of force” or “armed
attack” is fact-specific and open to significant debate. To date, cyber incidents
that clearly qualify as such have been rare.12
Despite the scarcity of cyber “armed attacks” or “uses of force,” malign
activity abounds in cyberspace, and it often violates the sovereignty or other
legal rights of target states. This malign activity, however, has been of a lower
intensity that does not rise to the level of armed attack, and therefore cannot be
addressed by self-defense.13 As General Paul Nakasone, commander of U.S.
Cyber Command, wrote in a 2019 article, “The locus of struggle for power has
shifted toward cyberspace, and from open conflict to competitions below the
level of armed attack.”14 Indeed, in 2018, the United States military amended its
cyber strategy to one of “persistent engagement” that “defend[s] forward to
disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls
below the level of armed conflict.”15 The operational concept of “Defend

10
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed Attack,” JUST
SECURITY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyber-operations-u-s-definition-armedattack/.
11
Id. (“A widely accepted view of the UN Charter is that a State can use force in self-defense only
in response to an ‘armed attack,’ which is importantly defined as the gravest forms of force in scale and
effects. In contrast, the United States has long maintained that a State can use force in self-defense in
response to any amount of force by another State.”).
12
See Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures, 32 TEMPLE INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 127 (2018) (“[T]here is a consensus that cyber operations are capable of rising to the level
of an armed attack that would trigger the right to self-defense. It is also clear that cyber operations can
violate the use of force prohibition. In such cases, a state could respond appropriately with either cyber
or non-cyber countermeasures, both in anticipation of an armed attack and in response to a use of force.
Happily, this situation of threatened armed attack is not the norm in today’s world, whether through cyber
or non-cyber operations.”).
13
See Michael J. Adams & Megan Reiss, How Should International Law Treat Cyberattacks Like
Wannacry?, LAWFARE (Dec. 22, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-shouldinternational-law-treat-cyberattacks-wannacry (“Setting aside the lack of consensus regarding the
applicability of particular international law rules and principles applicable to cyberspace activities (for
instance, the principle of sovereignty and rules regarding civilian objects and military objectives), our
leading concern is that U.S. elected officials and their appointees sometimes appear ill-informed about,
or unencumbered by, the use of force and armed attack thresholds established in Articles 2(4) and 51 of
the U.N. Charter, respectively.”).
14
Paul M. Nakasone, A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations, 92 JOINT FORCE Q. 10, 11 (2019);
see also Michael P. Fischerkeller & Richard J. Harknett, Through Persistent Engagement, the U.S. Can
Influence ‘Agreed Competition’, LAWFARE (Apr. 15, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
through-persistent-engagement-us-can-influence-agreed-competition (agreeing that “U.S. concern has
broadened to include not only an adversary’s potential use of cyber means to engage in coercion and
operations equivalent to a kinetic armed attack, but also cyber campaigns that can achieve strategic
outcomes without resort to war”).
15
DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY, CYBER STRATEGY (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/
2002041658/-1/1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF; see also U.S. CYBER
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Forward” is the “clearest indication of the U.S. recognition that cyber threats do
not merely take the form of discrete events but also are continuous operations
that must be defended against in real time.”16
Although target states cannot address this lower intensity cyber aggression
through self-defense, they have other options. They could conduct espionage
operations to gather information about their adversaries’ methods and
capabilities, in an effort to better prepare their own defense. They could engage
in retorsion, which is “an unfriendly but legal act in response to a malicious or
hostile act not amounting to a use of force[,]”17 such as trade sanctions or
diplomat expulsion. Perhaps the most aggressive response to sovereignty
violations that are not uses of force or armed attacks, however, are
countermeasures.
Countermeasures “are actions or omissions by an injured state directed
against a responsible State that would violate an obligation owed by the former
to the latter but for the qualification as a countermeasure.”18 Unlike retorsions,
countermeasures typically would violate international law absent the initial
state’s violation of international law. The International Law Commission, in its
2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (“the Draft Articles”), stated that “The commission by one State of an
internationally wrongful act may justify another State injured by that act in
taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to
achieve reparation for the injury.”19 Countermeasures are a particularly useful
component of newer operational concepts such as Defend Forward, which
recognizes the need to continuously defend against operations that do not rise to
the level of armed attack.20
In the Draft Articles, the Commission recognized that countermeasures are
susceptible to misuse or overuse, and therefore articulated a number of
restrictions, including that “they be directed at the responsible state and not at
third parties” and that they be made as “temporary” and “reversible” as

COMMAND, ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN CYBERSPACE SUPERIORITY, COMMAND VISION FOR U.S. CYBER
COMMAND, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%
202018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010 (“Adversaries continuously operate against us below the
threshold of armed conflict. In this ‘new normal,’ our adversaries are extending their influence without
resorting to physical aggression.”).
16
Jeff Kosseff, The Contours of ‘Defend Forward’ Under International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 2019 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, at 4 (2019).
17
Charlie Dunlap, Cyber Operations and the New Defense Department Law of War Manual: Initial
Impressions, LAWFARE (June 15, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-operations-andnew-defense-department-law-war-manual-initial-impressions.
18
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, at 111
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
19
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 75 (2001)
[hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility].
20
See Kosseff, supra note 16, at 7 (“To the extent that the operations do raise concerns about
sovereignty, these activities could be legally justified as countermeasures if conducted to inhibit a
persistent campaign of illegal acts against the United States, provided that they are not uses of force.”).
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possible.21 Moreover, countermeasures should be “proportionate,”22 meaning
the that they “must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in
question.”23 Before implementing countermeasures, the Draft Articles call on
the target state, with some exceptions, to request that the responsible state “fulfill
its obligations” under international law, “notify the responsible State of any
decision to take countermeasures[,] and offer to negotiate with that State.”24
States must terminate their countermeasures “as soon as the responsible state has
complied with its obligations” under international law.25
To understand the utility of countermeasures in cyberspace, consider the
following hypothetical example. State A’s government computer systems
experience repeated denial of service attacks, slowing down State A’s ability to
deliver a wide variety of services, such as passport processing and tax
administration. State A attributes the attacks, with a high degree of certainty, to
a government entity within State B. While it is unlikely that the denial of service
attacks would constitute an armed attack or a use of force, there is a reasonable
argument that they violated international legal obligations to State A, either by
intervening in the state’s internal or external affairs through coercion26 or by
usurping State A’s “inherently governmental functions.”27 Accordingly, State A
could argue that under the law of countermeasures, it could conduct
operations—targeted at the systems of State B that are targeting State A—that
are not armed attacks or uses of force, in an effort to slow or cease State B’s
malign activities.
A more difficult question arises if State A has limited capabilities,
technological resources, and staffing to penetrate State B’s systems. Could State
A’s better-resourced ally, State C, exercise countermeasures on behalf of State
A? In other words, could State C engage in collective countermeasures with the
goal of causing State B’s operations against State A to cease? Traditional
analysis of international law suggests that the answer to that question is a highly

21
ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 129; see also Paul A. Walker, Law of the
Horse to Law of the Submarine: The Future of State Behavior in Cyberspace, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2015 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, at 99 (2015) (“The purpose of using a
countermeasure is to effect a return to the status quo ante, that is, to get the offending State to resume its
obligations under international law. As such, the countermeasure(s) that a State undertakes should
generally be temporary and reversible, so as not to create a permanent violation of international law.”).
22
ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 134.
23
Id. at 134–35 (“Proportionality is concerned with the relationship between the internationally
wrongful act and the countermeasures. In some respects, proportionality is linked to the requirement
specified in Article 49: a clearly disproportionate measure may well be judged not to have been necessary
to induce the responsible State to comply with its obligations but to have had a punitive aim and to fall
outside the purpose of countermeasures enunciated in article 49.”).
24
Id. at 135.
25
Id. at 137.
26
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, at 312.
27
Id. at 111. See also Kosseff, supra note 16, at 8–9 (“The United States may only engage in
operations that qualify as countermeasures in response to an adversary’s breach of international legal
obligations owed to the United States. Such a breach would occur if another state usurped inherently
governmental functions, such as by initiating cyber operations that prevent a government from collecting
taxes or conducting elections. Moreover, the international legal principle of non-intervention prohibits a
state from intervening, through coercion, in another state’s internal or external affairs, including the
choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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equivocal “probably not,” though there are reasonable arguments both in support
and opposing collective countermeasures.
The closest statement to “binding law” on the issue came from a 1986
International Court of Justice case that Nicaragua brought against the United
States, arising from U.S. support for contra rebels in Nicaragua.28 Among the
United States’ justifications for its assistance of the contras was that Nicaragua
had provided assistance to armed opposition in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica, “and ha[d] committed trans-border attacks on those two states.”29
The International Court of Justice concluded that the United States could not
justify its actions as countermeasures taken against Nicaragua on behalf of these
other countries. Although self-defense to armed attacks may be conducted
collectively, the Court reasoned that such an option is not available for
countermeasures:
The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them
to have been established and imputable to that State, could only
have justified proportionate countermeasures on the part of the
State which had been the victim of these acts, namely El
Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify
countermeasures taken by a third State, the United States, and
particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of
force.30
The International Law Commission, in the 2001 Draft Articles, grappled
with the limited guidance as to the ability of states to exercise collective
countermeasures. In a review of the Commission’s deliberations that led to the
2001 Draft Articles, Otto Spijkers wrote that some states advocated for an
explicit approval of collective countermeasures, but they were met with strong
opposition that ultimately defeated the prospect:
For example, China believed that ‘collective countermeasures
could become one more pretext for power politics in
international relations, for only powerful States and blocs of
States are in a position to take countermeasures against weaker
States.’ Similarly, Russia remarked that ‘[i]t would be
unacceptable for any State to take countermeasures at the
request of any injured State, because that would give the big
Powers the opportunity to play the role of international
policemen.’ Some States did not reject collective
countermeasures per se, but demanded more safeguards
against abuse. For example, the Republic of Korea suggested
that ‘further efforts should be made to find a way to reduce
arbitrariness in the process of their implementation, and to
alleviate the influence of the more powerful States.’ And Iran

28
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 20 (June 27).
29
Id. at ¶ 248.
30
Id. at ¶ 249.
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‘stressed that countermeasures should not be used by powerful
States as a means of coercing smaller nations.’ Many States
expressed their desire for some provisions on dispute
settlement, presumably as a means to prevent the abuse of
(collective) countermeasures.31
James Crawford, who served as the Commission’s Special Rapporteur on
State Responsibility from 1997 to 2001, wrote that collective countermeasures
were the “issue that caused the most difficulty in the final stages” of the Articles’
drafting.32 Crawford wrote that collective countermeasures had some supporters,
but ultimately, not enough. “In the end, discretion seemed the better part of valor,
particularly having regard to the interaction of these issues with the general
mandate of the Security Council,” he wrote.33
The lengthy and spirited debate is evident in the text of the Draft Articles,
which do not directly address the legality of collective countermeasures, but
dance around the issue quite a bit. The Articles first note cases in which countries
have collectively responded to other countries via export and import bans,
suspension of landing rights, and condemnation.34 Article 48 allows a noninjured state to invoke another state’s responsibility if “the obligation breached
is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the
protection of a collective interest of the group,” or “the obligation breached is
owed to the international community as a whole.”35 The international law
regarding collective countermeasures, however, is “uncertain,” as “State
practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States,” the Commission
wrote.36 The Commission concluded that “it is not appropriate to include in the
present articles a provision concerning the question whether other States,
identified in Article 48, are permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce
a responsible State to comply with its obligations.”37 Thus, Article 54 states that
the countermeasures chapter “does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled
under Article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to
take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and
reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached.”38 The clause is intended to “reserve[] the position and
leave[] the resolution of the matter to the further development of international
law.”39 Article 54’s reference to “lawful measures” instead of
“countermeasures,” the Commission wrote, is intended not to “prejudice any
position concerning measures taken by States other than the injured State in
response to breaches of obligations for the protection of the collective interest

31
Otto Spijkers, Bystander Obligations at the Domestic and International Level Compared, 1
GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 47, 75–76 (2014) (quoting from International Legal Commission proceedings
before the United Nations) (internal citations omitted).
32
James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:
A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 884 (2002).
33
Id.
34
ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 19, at 138.
35
Id. at 126.
36
Id. at 139.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
39
Id. at 139 (alteration in original).

2020

COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES IN CYBERSPACE

25

or those owed to the international community as a whole.”40 Indeed, the Draft
Articles stated that “[o]ccasions have arisen in practice of countermeasures
being taken by other States, in particular those identified in Article 48, where no
State is injured or else on behalf of and at the request of an injured State.”41 The
Articles state that these types of countermeasures “are controversial and . . .
embryonic,” and that the Articles chapter regarding countermeasures “does not
purport to regulate the taking of countermeasures by States other than the injured
State.”42
The Draft Articles reflect a very tentative and open-ended compromise that
was the result of significant disagreement among states. According to a summary
of the Sixth Committee’s proceedings prepared by the United Nations
Secretariat’s office, some members worried about the potential for “abuse” of
such tools:
The taking of collective countermeasures by groups of States,
on behalf of an injured State, outside the context of action by
universal or regional international organizations, was opposed.
Others urged limiting the right to take countermeasures to the
State that was directly injured. It was further argued that the
relationship between collective countermeasures and Chapter
VII of the UN Charter was problematic; and that collective
countermeasures raise the problem of the coordination
between the States taking such measures.43
The removal of explicit provisions for collective countermeasures was wellreceived in the United Nations General Assembly. According to a summary of
the Sixth Committee’s proceedings the following year, the revisions to Article
54—and removal of explicit provisions for collective countermeasures—“made
it possible for the Draft Articles to be acceptable to all.”44 In a 2002 article,
David J. Bederman, who provided the Commission with comments on the Draft
Articles as chair of the American Society of International Law’s Panel on State
Responsibility, described the rationale for Article 54 and the reasoning for
ultimately deciding to exclude a provision that allowed collective
countermeasures:
To articulate a rule for collective countermeasures prematurely
would run the risk of “‘freez[ing]’ an area of law still very
much in the process of development.” But to say nothing on
the subject might have raised the (apparently) false impression
that collective countermeasures were barred and that only
“injured States,” as defined in the articles, were eligible to
impose them. The pragmatic compromise—and, indeed, the

40

Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
43
Summaries of the Work of the Sixth Committee, GAOR, Fifty-Fifth Session, https://www.un.org/
law/cod/sixth/55/summary.htm.
44
Id.
41
42
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only possible political solution—was to defer debate to
another day and to allow customary international lawmaking
processes to elaborate any conditions on the use of collective
countermeasures.45
Although the Draft Articles do not explicitly allow collective
countermeasures, they do not explicitly prohibit them. As Mehrdad Payandeh
wrote in 2010, the Articles do not “answer the question of whether the resort to
countermeasures by states that are not directly affected is legal when a serious
breach of a peremptory norm is involved.”46 Still, the limitation to “lawful
measures” can be read to disfavor collective countermeasures.47 Indeed, many
argue that collective countermeasures are impermissible under current norms.48
In short, the circa-2001 consensus did not explicitly approve of collective
countermeasures, in large part due to the many concerns that some states raised
during the discussions. However, it is clear from the Commission’s debate on
the subject that even in light of the Nicaragua opinion, there was not an
enthusiastic consensus on the prohibition of collective countermeasures, as at
least some states recognized the value in allowing nations to work together to
cause the cessation of internationally wrongful acts.
II. THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES IN CYBERSPACE
Legal experts have generally continued to be averse to collective
countermeasures when applying international law to cyber conflict. The most
thorough documentation of the prevailing views on the topic appears in the
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations,49
published in 2017. The Tallinn Manual sets forth black-letter rules, drawn from
the body of international law and analyzed by a group of legal scholars who
apply that law to the cyber realm. At the outset, it is important to note that while
the Tallinn Manual is influential and respected, it does not officially represent

45

David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 828 (2002).
Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the
Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 511
(2010).
47
See Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L
L. 798, 805 (2002) (“The fear is that the rights conferred by Article 48(1) could be used to justify
politically motivated acts or unilateral interventions by a state to enforce international law. To guard
against the possibility that a state might be subjected to countermeasures based on a spurious legal claim
that it has breached an obligation toward the international community as a whole, the chapter on
countermeasures, in Article 54, limits the right of any state entitled to invoke the responsibility of another
state under Article 48(1) to ‘lawful measures.’”) (internal citations omitted).
48
See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Prime Minister May’s Use-of-Force Claim: Clarifying the Law That
Governs the U.K.’s Options, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/primeminister-mays-use-force-claim-clarifying-law-governs-uks-options (“Only states that are injured may
impose countermeasures: This means that a victim state’s allies may not impose ‘collective
countermeasures’ on the wrongdoing state if only the victim state was actually injured.”). But see Schmitt,
supra note 9 (noting that “the right to take collective countermeasures remains unresolved in international
law”).
49
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 18, at 111.
46
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any particular state’s formal position on international law, nor does it represent
any state’s domestic law. The topic of collective countermeasures, however, did
not draw a unanimous consensus. Rule 24 provides that “[o]nly an injured state
may engage in countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not.”50 That
commentary appears quite straightforward, and generally in line with the
Nicaragua ruling and Draft Articles. However, the commentary accompanying
Rule 24 suggested disagreement on the use of collective countermeasures in
cyberspace.
The Tallinn Manual’s commentary acknowledges that the group of legal
experts could not reach consensus as to whether Article 48 of the Draft Articles
permits a state that was not “directly injured” by a responsible state to “resort to
countermeasures, as distinct from lawful measures, such as retorsion, to ensure
cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or the
beneficiaries of the obligation.”51 The commentary to Rule 24 of the Tallinn
Manual notes that states “routinely cooperate” on cyber defense initiatives, and
that such collaborations are permissible provided that they do not violate
international law.52 The commentary notes, however, that this observation “begs
the questions of whether a State or group of States may conduct countermeasures
on behalf of another State, as well as whether they may assist a State that is
conducting countermeasures.”53 Most of the legal experts who drafted the
Tallinn Manual answered “no,” adhering to the rule set forth in Nicaragua,
though a “few” experts opined that “a non-injured State may conduct
countermeasures as a response to an internationally wrongful act committed
against an injured State so long as the latter requests that it do so.”54
Moreover, the legal experts were divided as to whether a non-injured state
could provide a state with guidance on conducting cyber countermeasures.55
Some of the experts concluded that “measures designed to facilitate
countermeasures” are impermissible.56 Some concluded that legality “depends
on whether they would violate a legal obligation owed to the State against which
the countermeasure is directed by the State providing assistance.”57 Another
group of experts concluded that such assistance is legal.58 The Tallinn Manual
notes that all three groups agree that “a State that aids or assists a cyber operation
that fails to qualify as a countermeasure may be held responsible for aiding or
assisting an internationally wrongful act.”59 Moreover, the Tallinn Manual’s
authors agree that if an aggressor that violates its international legal obligations
to a group of states may face countermeasures from those states, including
through coordinated actions, provided that these countermeasures are
proportionate.60 The Tallinn Manual’s authors recognized that “[t]his is a
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particularly important observation because of the interconnectivity and
interdependency that characterizes cyberspace.”61 The Tallinn Manual’s general
(though far from absolute) inclination to reject collective countermeasures in
cyberspace is largely accepted.62
The interconnectivity and interdependency that the Tallinn Manual’s
authors discuss is precisely the reason why we must rethink the aversion to
collective countermeasures, at least so far as they are used in cyberspace. The
general reluctance to endorsing collective countermeasures stems from a 1986
International Court of Justice ruling, as interpreted by the International Law
Commission in 2001, during the early years of the modern Internet. These rules
were crafted years before most experts could have predicted some of the modern
threats that nations face from other state actors.
Consider, for instance, the NotPetya attack, which Wired magazine aptly
called in 2018 “the most devastating cyberattack” in history.63 As part of its
cyber conflict with Ukraine, Russia in 2017 unleashed the malware, which
exploited a vulnerability at a small Ukrainian software company to deploy
malware that “was honed to spread automatically, rapidly, and
indiscriminately.”64 Because of the indiscriminate nature of this cyberattack,
organizations around the world faced immense outages, delays, and costs. A year
after the attack, the Wall Street Journal summarized some of the global damage:
After NotPetya, FedEx has spent roughly $400 million in
remediation and related expenses, the company told analysts
in an earnings call last week. At Merck, NotPetya temporarily
disrupted manufacturing, research and sales operations,
leaving the company unable to fulfill orders for certain
products, such as the Gardasil 9 vaccine, which prevents
cancers and other diseases caused by the human
papillomavirus. The cyberattack cost Merck about $670
million in 2017, including sales losses and manufacturing and
remediation-related expenses, according to the company. . . .
Global advertising company WPP PLC, law firm DLA Piper
LLP, snack maker Mondelez International Inc. and other
multinationals said they lost basic systems such as email and
systems for invoices and customer orders in the attack. Some
have since reported related dips in revenue and increases in
technology spending. Danish shipping giant A.P. MollerMaersk A/S saw infections in part of its corporate network that
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paralyzed some systems in its container business and
prevented customers from booking ships and receiving
quotes.65
The United States and United Kingdom attributed NotPetya to Russia.66
International law would allow not only the Ukraine, but the United States,
Denmark, and any other state that was substantially impacted by NotPetya to
engage in countermeasures to cause Russia to cease its unlawful behavior.
However, such countermeasures are only permissible once the damage has been
done in those target countries. Would the United States have been permitted to
assist Ukraine with countermeasures to fend off early versions of NotPetya and
any predecessor attacks or intrusions that targeted Ukraine? The answer to that
question depends in large part on whether collective countermeasures are
permissible.
Under the prevailing view among the Tallinn Manual’s drafters, other states
would not be able to exercise countermeasures to cease Russia’s violations of
legal obligations owed to Ukraine; only after Russia also violated international
legal obligations owed to the state that seeks to implement the countermeasures.
One might ask: why the need for collective countermeasures? There are at
least five strong and related reasons that the international legal community
should take a bolder stance in favor of limited forms of collective
countermeasures.
First, the reluctance to endorse collective countermeasures is more tenuous
in the cyber realm than in the kinetic realm due to the highly interconnected
nature of threats in cyberspace.67 The prevailing conservative approach to
collective countermeasures was more justifiable in cases such as Nicaragua, in
which the spillover effects from Nicaragua’s acts were not nearly as extensive
as cases such as NotPetya. Granted, the United States attempted to justify its
actions as countermeasures because Nicaragua had assisted armed groups in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, and such assistance could impact global
stability and, in turn, U.S. interests. However, such impacts are highly attenuated
at best. A cyberattack initially aimed at one country, in contrast, is much more
likely to threaten the interests of other nations, even if they were not the initial
targets. As seen in the NotPetya aftermath, the global and interconnected nature
of the Internet makes it so much more susceptible to an act that initially targeted
State A causing very real impacts in State B (whether or not those impacts were
intended). State B has a strong interest in working with State A—and other likeminded nations—to stop illegal cyber operations in their earliest stages. Indeed,
such involvement is precisely the primary reason for countermeasures: to cause

65
Kim S. Nash, Sara Castellanos & Adam Janofsky, One Year After NotPetya Cyberattack, Firms
Wrestle With Recovery Costs, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-year-afternotpetya-companies-still-wrestle-with-financial-impacts-1530095906.
66
Id.
67
See POLLY M. HOLDORF, PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY REGIME, U.S. AIR
FORCE INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, STRATEGIC PAPER 10 (2015) (“As the world becomes more
interconnected, the security and prosperity of each state will be contingent on the security and prosperity
of other states, incentivizing great powers to cooperate more closely with each other, particularly
regarding cybersecurity.”).

30

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:1

the aggressor state “to cease the internationally wrongful conduct[.]”68 The
impacts of violations of international legal obligations in the kinetic world—
such as supporting armed rebellions—are far more likely to be contained to the
target nations than cyber threats. Earlier thinking about collective
countermeasures developed largely with kinetic threats in mind. At the very
least, the international legal community must evaluate whether the continued
opposition to collective countermeasures is desirable and effective for cyber
operations.
Second, some states have far more sophisticated cyber capabilities than
others, and collective countermeasures allow them to leverage those
comparative advantages. To be sure, one distinguishing feature of cyber
operations is their relative asymmetry.69 A state need not have thousands of
troops to execute an effective cyber countermeasure. Nonetheless, there are
significant differences among state cyber capabilities.70 A small state that has
invested less in its cyber forces could stand to benefit greatly from collective
countermeasures, as Gary Corn and Eric Jensen recently wrote:
Assume the technologically less capable victim state desires to
respond to an illegal act with a cyber countermeasure because
it believes such a response is less likely to lead to escalation,
but it does not have the cyber capability to do so. Allowing
collective cyber countermeasures would thus better serve
international peace and security. Additionally, assume the
victim state has some limited cyber capabilities, but not to the
degree of its allies. Though the victim state may be able to meet
the requirements of a proportional and reversible cyber effect,
it may still desire some outside assistance in scoping and
containing the specific cyber effect. In this case, a collective
countermeasure would also be a preferred option.71
The potential for assistance in cyber operations is significant. Collective
countermeasures are most closely linked to collaboration on offensive cyber
measures, as those might raise concerns about violating international legal
obligations. Additionally, collaboration may allow nations to conduct operations
that do not raise international legal concerns, such as espionage and assisting
with cyber defense. Although the nations can collaborate on espionage and
defensive assistance in a world without collective countermeasures, those
operations may well overlap with offensive measures. A system in which
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collective countermeasures are permissible would foster collaboration in these
other areas as well.
Third, collective countermeasures allow states to better address the
persistent nature of the threats that they face in cyberspace. Cyber hostility is
more likely to consist of constant adversarial actions, rather than the discrete
events that shaped the debate over collective countermeasures in the non-cyber
context. Nicaragua’s assistance to armed groups in three other states consisted
of distinct and separate acts. Compare that to the constant drumbeat of subarmed conflict cyber threats that nations face on a routine basis. Indeed, as
Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett wrote, the new U.S. cyber
strategy of persistent engagement “recognizes that cyberspace’s structural
feature of interconnectedness and its core condition of constant contact creates
a strategic necessity to operate continuously in cyberspace.”72 To be sure,
substantial, discrete hostilities still could occur in cyberspace (including those
that might rise above the armed attack threshold), but the current experiences
reflect the reality of a much more constant drumbeat of lower level operations.
Such persistent threats require states to use available tools, which typically will
not rise to the level of self-defense. Collective countermeasures allow states to
collaborate, pool resources, and more effectively combat this steady stream of
threats.
Fourth, the mere prospect of collective countermeasures could well have a
significant deterrent effect. If a state notoriously has weak cyber (and kinetic)
defense, it might at first appear to be a ripe target for collective countermeasures.
This is because it is unlikely that the target state would impose substantial costs
as a result of the action. Under a system that permits collective countermeasures,
however, the aggressor state might be less likely to conduct such operations out
of fear of countermeasures implemented by the target state’s better-resourced
allies. Paul Leaf made a case for such rationale in the non-cyber context, arguing
that if Chinese actions against American allies in Asia “threaten America’s vital
security interests, Washington must respond appropriately, and preferably
alongside its Asian partners. Collective countermeasures are less likely to arouse
major Chinese retribution, and they will deepen integration between the United
States and its friends in Asia.”73
Fifth, collective countermeasures could reduce the likelihood of escalation
by increasing the chances that responses to cyber aggression remain below the
use of force. If a target state is in desperate need of assistance from its allies, it
might be more inclined to classify an adversary’s actions as an armed attack, in
an effort to justify an allied response. Corn and Jensen note that depriving states
of the option of collective countermeasures might spur victim states to “overrank
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an incident in an attempt to allow the use of kinetic tools to resolve the
conflict.”74
The concerns raised during the drafting of the Articles cautioned that
powerful states could use collective countermeasures as a pretext for acting as
“international policemen.”75 Such worries about abuse are not unfounded;
indeed, unrestricted use of collective countermeasures could lead to substantial
escalation and abuse. That is why collective countermeasures would be subject
to all of the limitations that apply to countermeasures taken by the target state.
It also would be reasonable to impose additional responsible limits on third
parties seeking to engage in collective countermeasures. For instance, it would
be reasonable to require a request from a victim state before allowing a third
party to engage in collective countermeasures. Moreover, the third party should
publicly commit to the same countermeasure limitations that the victim must
adhere to, such as notification and accepting liability for exceeding the scope or
magnitude of permitted countermeasures. It also might be reasonable to expect
the third party to only engage in a range of collective countermeasures
authorized by the victim state; in other words, collective countermeasures should
not provide a third party with a carte blanche to violate the sovereignty of
another state.
Collective countermeasures would only be triggered by an internationally
wrongful act to another state. State A, for instance, could not arbitrarily justify
its actions against State B as collective countermeasures unless there has been
an actual violation of legal obligations to another state.76 Moreover, collective
countermeasures, as with any other countermeasures, would only serve the
purpose of “induc[ing] a responsible State to comply with the legal obligations
it owes an injured State.”77 A state could not use countermeasures for punitive
purposes.78 Further, a state must cease countermeasures once the aggressor state
no longer is violating international law.79 Suppose, for instance, that Russia was
to unleash another malware attack that initially targets a software company in
Ukraine. Under a system that permits collective countermeasures, the United
States could engage in limited cyber operations aimed at the Russian systems
that are targeting the Ukrainian company. Those countermeasures may only be
targeted at Russia and with the purpose of causing Russia to cease deploying
more malware.
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Moreover, to the extent that a state exercises collective countermeasures in
response to an injury suffered by another state, the magnitude of the
countermeasure is limited. The countermeasures also must be “proportionate,”
meaning that they are “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in
question.”80 Proportionality is evaluated objectively.81 In its discussion about
countermeasure proportionality, the Tallinn Manual states that relevant factors
include “the injury suffered (i.e., the extent of harm), the gravity of the wrongful
act (i.e., the significance of the primary rule breached), the rights of the injured
and responsible state (and interests of other states) that are affected, and the need
to effectively cause the responsible state to comply with its obligations.”82 There
is no reason to apply a less stringent standard to collective countermeasures. A
non-injured state’s exercise of collective countermeasures should be
proportionate to the injury suffered by the target state. Such proportionality
restrictions are consistent with Kaljulaid’s 2019 speech at CyCon, in which she
stated that collective countermeasures “should follow the principle of
proportionality and other principles established within the international
customary law.”83 In the example above involving Ukraine, the United States
would only be permitted to exercise countermeasures that are commensurate
with the injury that Ukraine already had suffered (and, of course, below the level
of a use of force).
Furthermore, it is possible for a non-injured state to merely assist the target
state, allowing the target state to implement the countermeasures. Such an
arrangement likely would raise fewer concerns under international law. Under a
broad conception of collective countermeasures, non-injured states do not
necessarily need to implement the countermeasures. Rather, they could assist
the injured state in engaging in the countermeasure. Indeed, some of the
international legal experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual believed that such
assistance is permissible.84 How would this look in practice? Imagine if the
election systems of a small state with relatively unsophisticated cyber operations
are persistently targeted by another state. A larger and more capable ally of that
smaller state could advise the smaller state not only on methods to shore up its
own defenses (something that raises no legal issues), but also on tactics to
infiltrate the systems that are targeting its election infrastructure in an effort to
disable the adversary’s offensive capabilities. The larger state’s purely advisory
capacity should raise fewer legal concerns than a situation in which the larger
state actually conducted the countermeasures.
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CONCLUSION
For good reason, the international legal community has been reluctant to
enthusiastically endorse the use of collective countermeasures. Critics of such a
system raise valid concerns that such actions could be subject to abuse, and that
they could escalate tensions. Although these concerns remain just as valid today
as when they were first raised decades ago, we also must consider the
countervailing benefits that they produce for the cyber realm. The
interconnected nature of cyberspace, along with the constant barrage of lowintensity threats, requires us to reconsider the aversion to the use of collective
countermeasures. If enacted with significant limitations, such as proportionality,
collective countermeasures could provide a net benefit to efforts to bolster cyber
defenses against persistent bad actors, while minimizing the potential for abuse
and escalation.

